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Testing Policy Theory with Statistical Models of Networks 
Mark Lubell, UC Davis, mnlubell@ucdavis.edu 
John Scholz, Florida State University 
Ramiro Berardo, Arizona State University 
Garry Robins, University of Melbourne 
Abstract 
This paper presents a conceptual framework for clarifying the network hypotheses embedded in 
policy theories and how they relate to macro-level political outcomes and micro-level political 
behavior.  We then describe the role of statistical models of networks for testing these 
hypotheses, including the problem of operationalizing theoretical concepts with the parameters 
of statistical models.  Examples from existing policy research are provided and potential 
extensions are discussed.  This paper is forthcoming as the introduction to a special issue of the 
Policy Studies Journal on statistical models of policy networks. 
 
Paper Prepared for Political Networks Conference, 2011. Ann Arbor 
Note to PolNet 2011 Readers:  Believe with Caution! 
This paper is in midstream so there are many missing references and sections that need 
additional work.  We would welcome any comments that would help clarify the ideas in the 
paper, and especially persuade readers about the value of applying statistical models of networks 
to policy theory.  Also, the references to the PSJ special issue might be confusing so feel free to 
ignore. 
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This special issue of PSJ provides an overview and examples of how statistical models of policy 
networks can clarify and test core hypotheses from theories of the policy process.  Statistical 
models of policy networks are a core component of network science, a newly evolving research 
field that integrates developments in network theory, methods, and applications from across 
many scientific fields (Lazer cite).  Political scientists have taken note of the “relational turn” in 
politics, and have started adopting and developing network science tools to analyze political 
phenomena (McClurg and Young 2011) and identify the relationships between network 
structure, macro-level outcomes, and micro-level behavior (Fowler et al. 2011).  
In public policy, Thatcher described how the use of network concepts has developed from rather 
ambiguous metaphorical descriptions to a series of overarching frameworks based (at least 
implicitly) on hypotheses about the dynamics of policy networks.  Testing the relevance of these 
alternative frameworks in specific policy domains requires empirical research on how policy 
networks form, affect individual and organizational behavior, respond to policy interventions, 
and influence policy outcomes.   The application of network analysis has evolved from using 
descriptive methods like centrality metrics, cluster analysis, and regression to statistical models 
that explicitly include relational variables and model the interdependence among policy actors.  
The statistical models to analyze policy networks that are discussed and used in this special issue 
offer the promise of more precise formulation and more appropriate testing of hypotheses from 
policy theory frameworks.     
Of equal importance, these models provide appropriate estimation techniques for mitigating an 
important threat to validity of empirical research implicit in any study of relationships—the 
assumed independence among observations.  Statistical models like regression, which use 
individual actors as the unit of analysis, rely on model assumptions that do not recognize the 
interdependence among actors that is implied by networks.  Network models are more in line 
with modern theoretical perspectives that treat public policy as a complex system that requires an 
analysis of interdependent interactions instead of decomposition into autonomous independent 
components.   
This introduction to the special issue presents a framework that views policy networks as a 
“meso” level concept that mediates causal relationships between macro-level political 
institutions and outcomes, and micro-level individual behavior (Evans 2001, Rhodes 1997).   
This framework can be used to conceptualize how micro and macro-level variables influence the 
structure of networks, how the structure of networks in turn influence micro-level behavior and 
macro-level outcomes, and how the constellation of macro-level variables, micro-level behavior, 
and network structure implicit in a policy system will influence policy outputs and outcomes.  
Statistical models of networks operate in this context by providing mechanisms for testing the 
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hypotheses from policy theories. These hypotheses are all related to specific causal pathways in 
the framework.  However, most of the extant research using statistical models focuses on 
selection effects—how individual variables influence network formation—and social influence 
effects—how network variables influence individual behavior and attitudes.  Hence, theoretical 
and methodological advancements are needed to expand the reach of statistical models of 
networks to more causal processes in policy systems.   
Policy researchers have focused mostly on three types of statistical models of networks:  
exponential random graph models (ERGM; Feiock et al. 2010, Henry et al. 2010, Thurner and 
Binder 2008), actor-oriented models (Berardo and Scholz 2010, Andrew 2009, cites), and 
quadratic assignment procedure (cite).  For policy theory, the primary challenge in utilizing these 
models is to clearly link model parameters to key concepts in policy network hypotheses.  For 
example, one possible parameter in an ERGM is “reciprocity” where the probability of a 
relationship from actor A to actor B is higher when the creation of that relationship reciprocates 
an existing tie from B to A.   The institutional rational choice framework hypothesizes that pairs 
of actors with reciprocal relationships in one domain are more likely to cooperate in other 
domains as well, and more generally that networks with high levels of reciprocity have a greater 
capacity for dyadic and multi-persom cooperation. Appropriate use of statistical models of 
networks requires specifying how a particular parameter in the model links to theoretical 
concepts from policy theory.   
Some prominent examples of policy theories that are appropriate for application of statistical 
models include institutional rational choice (Ostrom 1999), the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
(ACF; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990), and 
punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 1991).  For example, institutional economics 
posits the importance of embedded and reciprocal relationships for helping solve cooperation 
problems (Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Brehm and Rahn 1997). The ACF assumes that policy 
outcomes are a product of coalitions of actors with similar policy preferences acting together to 
influence decisions throughout a policy subsystem, that the political power of these advocacy 
coalitions depends on the cohesiveness of the associated networks among actors.  Policy 
diffusion theory suggests that information and persuasion about innovative polices flows through 
professional networks of policy decision-makers and entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Vergari 1998; 
Shipan and Volden 2008, Volden 2006, Mooney 2001).  Finally, punctuated equilibrium theory 
draws attention to the role of multiplex relationships spanning multiple policy, economic, and 
social arenas as a critical source of policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, Jones, Sulkin, 
and Larsen 2003).  We will provide more specific examples of how these theoretical frameworks 
relate to statistical models later in the paper. 
The first article in this special issue gives a technical summary of the primary statistical models 
currently employed in the policy networks literature.  Each of the remaining articles presents an 
application of a statistical model to test theoretical hypotheses in a particular policy or politics 
study system.   In addition, each article is positioned within the overall framework presented in 
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in these sets of rules, and policy interventions seek to change institutional rules in ways that 
trickle through the system to eventually affect outputs and outcomes.  Policy outputs and 
outcomes are usually the target of policy evaluation to determine the performance of the system 
in meeting social goals, and measures of networks and individual behavior are often used as 
proxies for policy outcomes when those outcomes are difficult to measure.  While cross-sectional 
studies capture this system at a single point in time, longitudinal studies recognize that the 
elements of a policy system are connected through dynamic feedbacks over time, indicated by 
the lowermost arrow.   
Policy network analysis recognizes network structures as a crucial element of the policy system 
that mediates the relationships between macro-level institutions and micro-level individual 
behavior, as indicated in Figure 1.  As Granovetter noted more generally (1985), individual 
actors are embedded in a web of relationships that alters their behavior within a given 
institutional context.  Within a market system, for example, buyers and sellers with overlapping 
long-term relationships are more likely to undertake risky exchanges than less-connected actors.  
Evolutionary game theory has shown that networks structure interactions among actors in a 
population, which plays a crucial role in determining the dynamics of behavior such as the 
evolution of cooperation (Nowak 2006). Ignoring the mediating role of networks at the very least 
risks missing an important element mediating macro and micro-level variables in a policy 
system, and may also lead to incorrect inferences and predictions about policy outcomes.  
The relationships among these levels of action are also dynamic and reciprocal, as represented by 
the double-headed arrows connecting networks with both individuals and institutions.  A change 
in institutional rules directly affects network structure by creating new opportunities for policy 
interactions and new incentives for partner selection.  Policy network structures interact with 
institutional rules to determine the capacity of communities of actors to influence policy 
decisions, including decisions to change the institutional rules.  Similarly, the lower arrow 
connecting networks and individuals represent both the influence of networks on individuals and 
the selection by individuals of their network relationships.  Policy networks influence individual 
behavior by structuring the types of resources and opportunities available to individuals, for 
example information and trustworthy exchange partners.  Individuals shape policy network 
structures through choices about network relationships, which may depend on a number of 
different processes driven by different goals, such as the search for similar alters, more access to 
non-overlapping resources, bridging between disconnected sections of the network, etc. Current 
network studies place the most emphasis on these social influence and network selection effects. 
The traditional domain of policy analysis considers the ways in which institutional rules affect 
individual behavior.   For example, institutional arrangements may directly influence individual 
decisions by punishing or rewarding different behaviors.  Network structures can provide similar 
functions.   However, conceptualizing institutions and networks as substitutes (cite problem 
papers) is too limiting, since institutions and networks simultaneously and interdependently 
influence behavior in any policy system and indeed any type of social organization. For example, 
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the burgeoning literature on “network management” (Klijn, Steijn and Edelenbos 2010; Klijn 
2005; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) clearly recognizes the potential symbiotic relationship between 
institutions and networks in proposals of how to manage the network structure by changing 
institutional rules. Statistical models promise to play an important role as the primarily 
qualitative approaches used to develop these proposals shift to more quantitative methods of 
testing their validity.    
Theories of the policy process analyze the relationships between the elements in the policy 
system framework as portrayed in Figure 1, but often the role of network structure is not 
explored in detail or even explicitly.  For example, individual behavior is analyzed under 
different institutional conditions, but only using individual-level variables to explain behavior.  
Some research does incorporate network effects in regression analyses, but treats them as if they 
are characteristics of the individual, and effectively ignores the complex interdependencies 
among individuals that violate the assumptions of most general linear models.  The statistical 
models we discuss below directly incorporate assumptions of interdependence, and allow 
analysts to test propositions about how network structures affect institutional rules and individual 
behaviors as well as how institutions and individual attributes affect network structures. Most 
available studies apply statistical models to processes of network formation, in part because 
understanding network formation is an important precursor to a broader investigation of the role 
of networks throughout the system, but also because available models are most developed to 
study network formation. Recent technological advances have provided some of the tools 
required to apply network models to other causal pathways in the policy system, providing the 
opportunity for creative advances in understanding the role of networks in the policy system. 
Testing Policy Theory with Statistical Models of Networks  
In this section we briefly introduce the main types of statistical models currently employed in 
policy network analysis: quadratic assignment procedures (QAP), exponential random graph 
models (ERGMs), stochastic actor-based models (SABM). These are summarized in Table 1 and 
will receive a more in-depth technical introduction in the next paper in this volume.  These 
models have in common an effort to account for interdependence.  In addition, ERGMs and 
SABM rely on statistical first principles and assumptions about the probability of observing 
different configurations of networks. The models can make predictions about the formation of 
relationships between actors, and how relationships affect actor characteristics, and how network 
structures are related across different sets of relationships.  The parameters of the models define 
how these various processes operate, and policy theory hypotheses provide expectations about 
the size and direction of different parameters.   
Early Approaches to Policy Network Analysis 
The earliest studies of policy networks focused primarily on descriptions of relationships and 
their implications for influencing decisions.  For example, Blau’s (1955) study of government 
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agencies recorded the informal pattern of collaboration within two government agencies, and 
related such measures as social cohesion to agency performance.   Studies have described the 
structure of policy networks and have argued that networks play important roles in central (e.g., 
Heclo 1978, Knoke et al 1996, Laumann and Knoke 1987) as well as local policy arenas 
(Laumann and Pappi 1976) for policy arenas as diverse as health services (Morrissey et al 1985, 
Provan and Milward 1995), educational performance (Meier and O’Toole 2002, Mintrom and 
Vergari 1998), and environmental issues (Bressers et al. 1995, Schneider et al. 2003, Herron et 
al. 1999, Jenkins-Smith and Clair 1993, Sabatier et al 1999).   
A second wave of studies utilized regression analysis to test specific hypotheses about the 
influence of network structures on the performance of individuals.  For example, a regression 
model might find that a network measure like degree (Meier and O’toole 2002) or  betweenness 
centrality (Scholz, Berardo and Kile 2008) influences the behavior of an actor.  However, the 
very significance of the network measure suggests that each observed unit is affected by other 
units of analysis, and such interdependence among observations directly contradicts the 
regression assumption of uncorrelated errors.   This potential problem may not be severe when 
individual ego networks are sampled that are not interconnected, as in national voting studies, 
but it poses considerable risk of bias in policy studies in which most stakeholders are 
interconnected with each other (cite?).  There are methods to minimize bias from 
interdependencies by taking the autocorrelation among observations into account, although their 
ability to account for the particular types of interdependencies implicitly assumed by the network 
position measures included in the model are not well known.  Statistical models of network 
explicitly account for this type of interdependency.   
A second problem arises due to potential multicollinearity when multiple measures of network 
position are entered into the model to test alternative hypotheses about expected network effects. 
For example, while there are several measures of network centrality (e.g;. degree centrality and 
betweenness) that are conceptually different (Freeman 1979),  in practice they are often highly 
correlated.   Multicollinearity in such cases leads to unstable results in which significance levels 
of other network variables can shift dramatically with the addition or exclusion of a single 
variable.  The problem is exacerbated when theory is not developed enough to determine the 
appropriate network measure and regression models are used to explore which measures are 
most strongly associated with performance.   Given the current lack of developed theory about 
the role of meso-level network concepts in policy studies, regression provides a poor tool for 
exploring alternative hypotheses about the role of different network measures.  
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The Advantages and Limitations of Statistical Models All of the statistical models listed in 
Table 1 explicitly were developed to estimate network effects for interdependent observations 
within a single network, as discussed in Robins article in this volume.   
Table 1:  Summary of Key Statistical Models of Networks 
Quadratic Assignment Procedure:  Tests whether or not two matrices are correlated, either with 
bivariate or multiple regression measures of association.  QAP uses a bootstrapping approach to 
randomly “relabel” the networks and examine the distribution of network statistics from the 
resulting population of networks.  If the observed correlation or measure of association is outside 
the 95% confidence interval obtained from the set of bootstrapped networks, the statistic is 
considered significantly different from a random network.  
Exponential Random Graph Models:  Assume network ties are formed through a stochastic 
process, the simplest of which is a Bernoulli process where there is a uniform probability of 
forming any particular link.  More complex models include parameters indicating how the 
probability of a tie is a function of the how that tie will change the frequency of different types 
of structures within the networks, for example the number of reciprocal relationships or 
transitive triads.  
Stochastic Actor-Based Models:  Used for longitudinal network data, and assumes actors are 
changing network ties in continuous time where the probability of tie formation depends on the 
state of the network at a particular time.  Actors are assumed to choose ties in ways that 
maximize their utility from the network structure; actors have preferences over their structural 
position in the network. 
 
In addition, especially the SABM is built on statistical first principles that elucidate the micro-
foundations of individual behavior in relation to network structure. QAP and ERGM are largely 
descriptive models that fit parameters to data, where policy theory motivates hypotheses about 
the expected direction, magnitude, and significance of different network parameters. SABM goes 
further by explicitly considering network structure in the utility function of the actors, and 
therefore is more transparent about the underlying behavioral assumptions.  The broader 
literature on network science, for example the physics literature on processes of network 
formation and the networked games literature (Nowak 2006), also have more precise 
descriptions of the micro-level processes governing network formation.  In the tradition of 
empirical implications of theoretical models, statistical models of networks need further 
development to more tightly couple the empirical analysis to specific theories of micro-level 
behavior.   
SABM also provide some features not available in ERGMs, which generally reflect the benefits 
of longitudinal research designs over cross-sectional ones.  SABM does not require the 
assumption of cross-sectional ERGM models that the observed network is in an equilibrium 
reflecting the desires of the stakeholders, since it only models the changes that occur between 
observations.  SABM controls for exogenously determined links that are not subject to choice by 
the actor because the first observation of the network provides a baseline for analyzing changes 
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in subsequent observations.  Since the first observation will include links reflecting preexisting 
legal requirements about stakeholder relationships, these requirements will not bias the model of 
stakeholder choice.  Finally, the longitudinal model has the potential to simultaneously estimate 
the impact of network relationships on performance or other attributes of the actors.  That is, the 
models can jointly estimate the selection equation to show actor preferences for specific 
relationship structures and the influence equation to show the impact of network partners and 
structures on attitudes and performance.   
Network models in general still face empirical challenges to realize their full potential.    In 
particular, they commonly assume that all links and attributes in the network are known, a 
standard unlikely to be met by most network research designs especially those relying on survey 
data.  Systematic methods for handling missing data are being developed for different situations, 
but more field tests and experiments are required to understand which of these techniques are 
useful for policy networks as well as how alternative observation techniques affect network data 
and model estimation based on that data for tests of interest to policy scholars.   
Applications of Network Models to Policy Theory 
We next describe some examples from several theories of the policy process that have used 
network statistical models to test hypotheses.  Each of these theories implies something about 
network structure, and often develops hypotheses about the causal pathways that involve 
networks.   Most of the current applications focus on how institutions and individual behavior 
influence network formation, and how network structure influences individual behavior (the 
lower arrow  in Figure 1), with relatively less attention paid to the interactions between 
institutional settings and networks.  To reiterate, the major ongoing scientific endeavor in the 
literature is to map the concepts involved in these policy hypotheses into the parameters of 
specific network models.   Each section below first summarizes the key network ideas 
considered by the relevant theoretical framework, and then describes some of the leading 
existing applications, or potential applications in cases where research opportunities exist. 
Institutional Rational Choice  
The primary endeavor of the institutional rational choice (IRC) literature is analysis of 
collective-action problems at the level of individuals and government authorities.   IRC assumes 
that actors are at least boundedly rational and that they seek relations with others that may help 
mitigate collective-action problems. To illustrate the network approach to this issue, consider the 
widely-recognized distinction between bridging and bonding relationships and the general idea 
that bridging relationships enhance coordination and information flow while bonding 
relationships enhance cooperation and trust.   
Bonding is associated with redundant, overlapping, cohesive, “strong-tie” relationships that in 
turn are associated with the development of trust, common norms, credibility of commitments, 
and maintenance of cooperative relationships (Coleman 1988, Putnam 1993, Burt 2005).  
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Bonding relationships are sought when the underlying problem imposes considerable risk that 
the selected partner may defect, for example when government agencies undertake expensive 
joint projects. Cooperative relationships are supported over time by reciprocal ties (Axelrod), and 
transitive relationships where a third agency can monitor the behavior of two other partners 
(Nowak, Coleman 1988).  Thus organizational relationships reflect the same principles as 
individual relationships in which networks of reciprocity and overlapping networks of civic 
engagement among trusted partners play critical roles in the development of social capital to 
resolve collective dilemmas (Putnam 1993).  
Bridging relationships or “weak ties”, on the other hand, can provide important resources more 
efficiently than bonding relationships when risks are lower.  Bridging relationships are sought 
when information or resources are available somewhere in the policy arena, and the main 
problem is to locate them.  For example, if many local governments are facing the same novel 
problem and one government finds a solution, other governments can find out about this solution 
through any set of intermediaries.  Similarly, if local governments could take advantage of 
positive externalities by all adopting similar policies (e.g purchase same equipment to share 
procurement, maintenance and training costs), then weak ties can serve to coordinate policy 
choices as long as the policies provide equal payoffs.  In such situations, the extra effort required 
to maintain redundant strong ties would be wasted.   
A general policy theory of bridging and bonding relationships would involve hypotheses about 
both the type of relationships sought by stakeholders and the impact of those relationships on 
performance and outcomes.  For example, when macro-institutions impose prisoners dilemma or 
public goods games on policy stakeholders, individuals would be expected to seek bonding 
relationships and bonding relationships in turn will enhance the policy performance of individual 
actors.  On the other hand, bridging relationships may produce better outcomes in some 
circumstances when information is required, and hence may be sought by stakeholders in those 
situations.  Comparing across systems, networks with different levels of bridging or bonding 
network structures are expected to perform better under different conditions.   
Network analysis provides a tool for translating these general concepts into specific network 
structures to be included in statistical models.  The initial work in this area adopted Burt’s (2005) 
approach of using regression models to test the impact of network position on individual 
performance (SBK, B, W, SWB, Shrestha).  For example, SBK use a simple measure of bonding  
social capital in terms of the proportion of the ego’s partners (alters) that are linked to each other, 
which equals one when all alters are linked and zero when no alters are linked.  Using regression 
analysis where the dependent variable is participation in collaborative policy activities, SBK find 
no support that bridging ties influence individual behavior.  However, there are a wide range of 
other measures of bridging and bonding social capital that capture different assumption about 
network processes (Borgatti 2005; Burt) and investigating when these different measures 
influence behavior is an important empirical task.  However, the use of network measures in a 
traditional regression context is not an effective tool for this task because of the problems of 
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collinearity of measures confounded by the interdependence of observations within a single 
policy arena.   
Statistical models of networks can be used to test specific hypotheses about different measures, 
although theories about bridging and bonding need to be translated into the slightly different set 
of concepts and related measures in the ERGM and SABM frameworks.  Do stakeholders or 
policy arenas with higher values of the relevant measure perform better on the relevant outcome 
measures?  Do most stakeholders seek the most productive type of relationships, and are they 
most prevalent in arenas in which they are expected to be most productive?  For example, are 
agencies that fill structural holes most likely to achieve their policy goals, and do agencies select 
partners in order to fill structural holes? 
Berardo and Scholz (2010) use a SABM to test how different measures of bridging and bonding 
social capital affect network formation over time in the context of water management.  
Reciprocity measures the tendency for a directed link from organizations A to B to be 
reciprocated with a directed link from B to A.  In addition, transitivity indicates the tendency for 
A to have a directed link to C if A is linked to B and B is linked to C.  These two measures 
represent different aspects of bonding relationships.  Hypotheses about actor preferences for 
bonding relationships can be tested by including the specific relationship in the model.  Berardo 
and Scholz found, for example, that the coefficient for reciprocity was significant but the 
coefficient for transitivity was not.  They interpreted this to mean that only reciprocity was 
sought in the policy arenas they studied, and not transitivity.  Thus they inferred that actors were 
concerned enough about risky exchanges to favor reciprocity, but were not as concerned about 
risky exchanges for which transitive relationship.  Thus the model was sufficiently sensitive to 
test these slightly different structural representatives of bonding capital. 
Perhaps their most important finding was that bridging relationships played the most active role 
in structuring the network.  Actors wanted contacts with popular organizations that already were 
contacted by other organizations, which is also called preferential attachment.   This preference 
tends to produce highly central actors, which Berardo and Scholz argue represents an emergent 
central coordination mechanism.  Whether these interpretations of the model will stand the test 
of time and comparisons with other results remains to be seen, but the results at least suggest the 
promise of utilizing these new families of network models to provide more detailed testing of 
bridging and bonding hypotheses. 
In sum, the longitudinal actor oriented model and related models promise several advantages for 
testing bridging and bonding hypotheses for posited in the IRC framework.  First, they permit 
and indeed require clear specification of what constitutes a bridging and bonding relationship.  
Second, they can distinguish which of several possible relationships are critical with less concern 
about biased estimation that affects regression approaches, although very similar relationships 
may not be distinguishable in some empirical settings even with these models.  Third, they can 
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test for differences in effect for different types of nodes or for different networks within a pooled 
sample containing networks from multiple independent policy arenas. 
Advocacy Coalition Framework  
The Advocacy Coalition Framework argues that actors with similar social beliefs and policy 
preferences form political coalitions that compete for influence within multiple policy venues 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).  Early ACF research empirically analyzed coalitions with 
qualitative data or descriptive quantitative techniques like cluster analysis of beliefs measured in 
surveys, but never directly observed relationships between actors (see Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier 1994 for a review).  Schlager (1995) criticized these approaches ignoring the collective-
action problems involved with coalition formation, and assuming that similar beliefs always 
produced coordinated action.  Statistical models of networks are ideally suited to directly testing 
hypotheses about coalition formation. Furthermore, network concepts can help extend the basic 
principles of this framework from the limiting case of policy arenas with clearly-defined 
competing coalitions to arenas with a wide diversity of relationships ranging from sparse, less 
structured issue networks to more densely linked policy communities (cite Heclo, Rhodes?).  
ACF hypotheses about policy learning and coalition formation may also enrich our 
understanding of learning and partner selection in networks. 
In an early application of network analysis to ACF, Weible and Sabatier (2005) use clustering 
analysis and multi-dimensional scaling to identify coalitions based on networks of allies, 
coordination, information sharing. They find that ally and coordination networks have a large 
amount of belief similarity, but information networks have more connections between actors 
with different beliefs.  This suggests that the relationship between beliefs and network formation 
depends on the type of network relationship considered.  The analytical methods also 
demonstrate the use of more descriptive methods of network analysis, which provide an 
important basis for the application of statistical models.  
Henry et al. (2010) use ERGM models to directly test ACF hypotheses about the formation of 
policy networks.  Using survey data from policy stakeholders in land-use and transportation in 
California, they hypothesize that advocacy coalitions are defined by cohesive networks of 
collaboration among stakeholders with similar belief systems.  In network terminology, 
advocacy coalitions will exhibit belief homophily, which is a version of the “birds of a feather 
flock together” phenomena observed in many types of networks (cite).   
Henry et al. (2010) contrast belief homophily to the role of social capital in knitting together 
advocacy coalitions, and thus directly compare hypotheses from institutional rational choice.  
Advocacy coalitions that are based on social capital are expected to have a high number of 
reciprocal or transitive relationships (if actor A knows actor B and actor C, then actor B knows 
C).  While the social capital hypotheses are anchored in the rational choice paradigm, belief 
homophily draws on social psychology and considers potentially “irrational” behavior.  For 
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example, belief homophily may be strong enough to overcome free-riding problems and 
effectively substitute for social capital in the formation of collaboration networks.  Belief 
systems may also serve as barriers to policy learning because people discount information that is 
inconsistent with their policy-core beliefs and overweight consistent information.  Hence, 
subjective beliefs about the causes and consequences of policy problems will be different across 
advocacy coalitions, and possibly deviate from a more rational and evenhanded analysis of 
objective data.    
These hypotheses are tested with ERGM models that predict the probability of collaborative 
relationships forming among land-use and transportation actors.  From Figure 1, these models 
are about how individual belief systems and preferences for network structure affect the overall 
process of network formation.  Belief homophily was measured using the average distance 
between two actors' responses to a series of questions about land-use and transportation issues.  
The parameter for the belief distance variable was negative and statistically greater than zero.   
Reciprocity and transitivity are directly included in the ERGM model as a structural property of 
the network.  While the parameter for reciprocity was negative, the parameter for transitivity was 
positive, suggesting that the cohesiveness of coalitions is mainly a function of processes of 
network closure rather than direct exchange.  More in depth analysis of the data provides 
evidence that transitivity is supported by policy brokers attempting to strengthen advocacy 
coalitions.   The empirical results suggest that belief homophily and transitivity are 
complementary social processes that influence the cohesiveness of advocacy coalitions.  Even 
when actors with similar belief systems seek to collaborate, network closure driven by policy 
brokers is needed to reduce free-riding incentives.   
Punctuated Equilibrium and the Ecology of Games  
The punctuated equilibrium model assumes that incremental policy changes in a given policy 
arena are best explained by the “equilibrium” conditions within that arena, but that major policy 
changes is best explained by factors exogenous to the arena that dramatically shift the 
equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones ??).  In particular, actors may participate in different policy 
venues, expanding conflict and shopping for decisions that shift the status quo in their favor.  
Thus to understand policy change, we need to understand at the systemic level how the 
interrelationships among policy arenas create conditions that cause the collapse of one 
equilibrium and the emergence of another.   
One implication for policy networks is that the structure of networks within a policy arena may 
be sufficient to explain incremental policy changes and implementation results within the arena, 
but that the “multiplex” structure of networks across arenas may be more important in explaining 
major policy shifts.  That is, the relationships among stakeholders active in multiple policy 
arenas may provide critical pathways for altering stable coalitions within each arena.  
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In a similar approach that is more specifically focused on networks, Padgett and Powell (2011?) 
analyze the interactions between social, economic, and political networks that have lead to 
dramatic institutional changes including the emergence of corporations and partnerships in 
medieval Tuscany, of joint-stock companies in early Netherlands, and of economic reforms in 
the communist systems of the former Soviet Union and China.  In each case, Padgett and Powell 
argue that the new institutional equilibrium could not be understood if social, economic, and 
political networks were analyzed separately.  It was the overlapping roles of prominent 
individuals across these networks that provide unique opportunities to forge new institutional 
relationships that would not have been possible within the existing institutional and relational 
patterns in each separate network.   
Although statistical network models have not yet been applied to the punctuated equilibrium 
framework, Lubell et al. has revived Norton Long’s “ecology of games” metaphor in a 
theoretical framework that synthesizes elements of institutional rational choice and punctuated 
equilibrium.  The ecology of games framework emphasizes the critical role of multiplex 
relationships spanning multiple policy “games” for coordinating decision-making.   Multiple 
decision arenas (games) affect the interests of actors in the ecology, so stakeholders have to 
decide what efforts to put into each potential game and which partners to seek in each of the 
games.   
Lubell et al (2011) use ERGM models of bi-partite networks to show that national and state 
government actors, along with inclusive collaborative institutions, are central nodes in the 
ecology of games that serve to coordinate actions. Furthermore, actors are embedded in closed 
network structures that are analogous to transitive triads in a unipartite network, suggesting that 
actors tend to participate in similar games to potentially monitor cooperative behavior.  A 
longitudinal study of the ecology of games may be amenable to SABM analysis and show how 
actors changing venues are attempting to push for policy change.   
The Diffusion of Policy Innovations  
The study of how policy innovations diffuse is also an area of interest for policy scholars that 
would benefit immensely from a broader use of some of the models that we discuss in this issue. 
Policy innovation diffusion research dates back to the late 1960s and early 1970s (Walker 1969, 
Gray 1973), but experienced an important resurgence in the 1990s, with Berry and Berry’s 
(1990) explanation of how state governments adopt lotteries. Since then, many scholars have 
contributed to identifying and describing in detail the functioning of multiple diffusion 
mechanisms, including but not limited to imitation (Shipan and Volden 2008, Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004), learning (Volden 2006, Mooney 2001), geographical 
proximity (Berry and Berry 1990), and economic competition (Berry and Baybeck 2005).  
Regardless of the political and economic forces driving diffusion, networks obviously play a 
crucial role in diffusion because information about the costs and benefits of different policy 
options flows through them (Berry et al. 2004; Rogers 1995; Walker 1969).   
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However, despite their importance as conduits for the transmission of resources that enhance the 
chances of policy diffusion, the networks composed by the policy actors that have a saying in 
policy adoption and/or consideration have not been analyzed to date with the statistical models 
we discuss in this issue. This, of course, is not a criticism of the tools used to date by scholars in 
this tradition, which have provided leverage to sort out the effects that both macro and micro-
level variables have on adoption and/or consideration of policies. For instance, Event history 
analysis (EHA) has been the predominant methodological approach to estimate the probability of 
policy adoption, where the role of networks as an intervening variable mediating macro and 
micro-level variables is indicated by the inclusion in models of independent variables such as the 
decisions of neighboring actors.  Other authors have used methods akin to network models, for 
example Volden (2006) and Gilardi (2010) use dyadic-based approaches to show how actors 
“learn” from their peers through the transmission of relevant information.  All this previous work 
has contributed immensely to our collective knowledge of the conditions that facilitate policy 
diffusion, and would be certainly enriched by the application of the statistical models we expose 
in this issue because they would allow for a more comprehensive exploration of how networks 
interact with macro and micro-level variables that we already know affect policy diffusion.   
For this to happen, diffusion networks should be explicitly measured, with the nodes being the 
(potentially) adopting units, and the links representing the channels of communication between 
them, through which a variety of resources may flow. For example, many local and state actors 
gather information about policy options through communication with their colleagues or 
searching websites of other jurisdictions or government agencies.  Such studies could test core 
hypotheses from the diffusion literature, for example the idea that policy diffusion is a nation-
scale process as opposed to one driven mostly or even solely by geographic proximity at the 
local or state level (Haider-Markel 2001; Mintrom 2000–see Karch 2007 for a detailed 
discussion on this subject).  
The diffusion of policy innovation is also said to be dependent on the “connecting” role of policy 
entrepreneurs, who may go beyond geographical proximity to find actors with the knowledge 
and political resources needed to pursue a particular policy agenda (Mintrom 1997).  While we 
know some details about the capacity of entrepreneurs to influence policy consideration 
(Mintrom and Vergari 1998), we still can improve our empirical understanding of how they aid 
policy diffusion by measuring carefully when and to which potential adopters they relate in 
networks of diffusion.  For instance, one could measure how potential adopters link to specific 
entrepreneurs and establish whether sharing access to those entrepreneurs affects the likelihood 
of adopting common policies. This type of analysis would contribute to dissecting in more detail 
the real power of entrepreneurs as brokers of information that may create the conditions for the 
diffusion of policies.  
Different types of statistical models could be used to examine these hypotheses. With stochastic 
actor-oriented or ERGM models, for example, access to given entrepreneurs could be codified as 
nodal attributes, with the nodes being the potentially adopting units. With cross-sectional QAP 
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procedures one could represent this same type of information with a distance matrix measuring 
how much potential adopters “share” policy entrepreneurs, which could then be used to explain 
changes in a different matrix containing data indicating the adoption or not of common policies.  
What’s important to keep in mind is that the range of questions that could be answered with the 
statistical models of networks that are discussed and used throughout this issue is substantive and 
that their answer would surely contribute to a much better developed framework of how policy 
diffusion works. Some of these questions could be: Does transitivity exist in diffusion? Are races 
to the bottom triggered by the overlapping nature of information that circulates in tightly-linked 
clusters or by the ability of governments to gather information through weaker links to more 
distant parts of the network? Does an innovator only find valuable information in its immediate 
neighborhood, or does it benefit from a broader search strategy that renders cooperation more 
likely, even with potential partners who are relatively unknown? We believe policy diffusion 
scholars stand to gain a great deal from a more extensive use of network analytic techniques to 
describe the nuanced effects that participation in networks has on the adoption, consideration 
(and of course, even rejection) of policies.  
Conclusion 
Network science and analysis provides an excellent opportunity for refining and testing 
theories of the policy process.  Each of the well-known theoretical frameworks discussed in this 
paper posit some type of network hypothesis about the formation of networks and the effect of 
networks on individual behavior and policy outcomes.  More fundamentally, network science 
recognizes that the structure of social and policy relationships mediates the causal processes 
between macro-level institutions and micro-level behavior.  In this sense, the research in policy 
theory exemplifies the broader trend in all of social sciences where networks have become a 
central research topic. 
Statistical models of networks operationalize the theory by explicitly operationalizing 
core theoretical concepts with specific network metrics.  The statistical models are superior to 
more traditional regression approaches because they take into account the necessary 
interdependence among actors.  Such interdependence could be considered an empirical nuisance 
that needs to be handled to provide unbiased and efficient estimates. But statistical models of 
networks provide a more fundamental basis for inference, including clarifying some of the 
underlying micro-foundations of network processes.  However, much of the policy theory 
research to date has focused on hypotheses of network formation instead of how networks affect 
individual behavior and policy outcomes.  Future applications of network models must be 
expanded the wider range of causal arrows in Figure 1, as well as more explicitly capture micro-
level foundations.  
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